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Abstract 
 
Population aging has significant economic and social costs, and this paper studies its 
impacts on inequality, both theoretically and empirically. First, we build a two-period 
overlapping-generation model with an uncertain lifetime and find that population aging has 
the overall effect of increasing income and consumption inequality within the society. For the 
empirical analysis, we use household data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey to 
assess the age effect on income and consumption inequality in the People’s Republic of 
China and confirm the results predicted by the theoretical model. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Population aging has become a major concern in many countries, mainly due to the 
accompanying economic and social costs. According to the United Nations’ population 
projections, around 600 million people aged 65 or older are alive today, and by 2035 
this figure is expected to exceed 1.1 billion, 13% of the total population. This is a 
natural corollary of the declining birth rate and growing life expectancy. The “old-age 
dependency ratio,” that is, the ratio of old people (aged 65 or above) to labor force 
(aged 15–64), will grow even faster. From 1960 to 2015, this ratio for the world 
population increased by more than 46%, from 8.611 to 12.338.1 By 2050, it is expected 
to increase to 25, while in rich countries it will be much higher. Japan will have  
73 old-age people for every 100 work-age people by 2050, an increase from 35 in 
2010. 2  Although developing countries have benefited from a young population 
structure, they are now starting to struggle with an aging population, as the fertility 
rates are falling below the natural replacement level. For example, over the same 
period, the old-age dependency rate in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will more 
than double from 15 to 36, while Latin America will experience a shift from 14 to 27 
(The Economist 2014). 
Theoretically, the distributional effect of population aging, triggered by a low birth rate 
and high life expectancy, can be explained through several channels. First, Friedman’s 
(1957) permanent income hypothesis (PIH) and Modigliani’s (1966) life cycle theory 
both predict that the consumption and income dispersion of any cohort of people  
born at the same time will increase with age, because individuals’ income and 
consumption are affected by their own history of education, employment, health, 
idiosyncratic luck, family background, and so on. Under the PIH framework, Eden 
(1980) proposes that the variance of consumption should increase within cohorts. The 
statistical evidence that Deaton and Paxson (1994a) presented shows that income 
inequality tends to increase with age in Taipei,China, Great Britain, and the United 
States. Slower population growth, by raising the average age of the population, should 
raise the aggregate inequality through this channel. Second, Higgins and Williamson 
(2002) suggest that slower population growth tilts the population age distribution toward 
mature, more experienced cohorts, possibly reducing the experience premium and 
hence moderating the aggregate inequality. Third, Bussolo, Koettl, and Sinnott (2015) 
stated that “low or even negative population growth would increase wages relative  
to returns to capital. Since ownership of capital assets tends to be concentrated, this 
change in relative factor returns could reduce income inequality. Furthermore, capital 
holders, usually older people, are likely to lose while young workers gain.” 
Existing empirical studies explore this relationship mainly within high-income 
economies. Some findings suggest that population aging accounts for only a small 
fraction of the overall increase in income inequality (e.g., Bishop, Formby, and Smith 
1997; Barrett, Crossley, and Worswick 2000). Several studies show that an aging 
population affects income inequality through public transfer systems, though the 
empirical evidence is mixed. Gruber and Wise (2001) analyze the OECD data and 
conclude that aging has led to a decline in the share of resources allocated to the 
elderly; similarly, Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) show that a rise in the overall 
dependency ratio leads to a decline in social transfers. In contrast, Preston (1984) 
contends that the elderly in the US can claim a disproportionate share of public 
resources as their number and political power grow. An increasing amount of research 
1  Data source: The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND.OL 
2  Data source: The Economist. http://www.economist.com/node/13611235 
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focuses on exploring the linkage between an aging population and inequality from the 
perspective of the PIH. Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) explore the US case, 
suggesting that the age effects on income and consumption inequality within a cohort 
are consistent with the theoretical predictions of an overlapping-generation general 
equilibrium model in which households face uninsurable earnings shocks throughout 
their lifetime. Ohtake and Saito (1998) show that half of the rapid increase in the 
consumption inequality in Japan during the 1980s resulted from population aging,  
while one-third was due to the increasing cohort effect. Under the PIH framework, a 
number of new empirical studies attempt to link changes in consumption inequality in 
high-income countries to models of partial insurance (e.g., Krueger and Perri 2006; 
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston 2008). More recent empirical evidence from developed 
and aging countries indicates that age groups tend to become more vulnerable and 
unequal over their life cycle, because, among people within the same age group,  
some manage to accumulate more wealth over a longer working life while others risk 
falling into poverty, with limited savings stretched over a longer retirement period 
(Bussolo et al. 2015; Attanasio and Pistaferri 2016). Another stream of research 
employs the regression-based inequality decomposition approach to examine the role 
of demographic change in income distribution. Using data from Taipei,China, Chu and 
Jiang (1997) show that the pattern of Gini coefficients is significantly affected by the 
age composition factor.  
Overall, the evidence from high-income economies is in line with the PIH, according to 
which households can turn to insurance and credit markets to smooth their lifetime 
consumption against short-term shocks. However, little is known about situations in 
developing countries, where the financial markets are underdeveloped and the liquidity 
constraints are pervasive. The population of East and Southeast Asia is aging rapidly 
as a consequence of demographic transition, triggered by the increase in life 
expectancy, aging of post-war baby boomers, and declining birth rate. If the life cycle 
models are correct, population aging is likely to increase inequality. Whereas this 
largely mechanical effect may not pose a direct threat to welfare, it is important to 
understand it, even if only to avoid the unnecessary imposition of corrective policies. 
Kurosaki, Kurita, and Ligon (2009) provide evidence that within-cohort inequality in 
consumption decreases with age in Thailand, Pakistan, and India. However, Rougoor 
and Van Marrewijk (2015) forecast that the global income inequality will reach its 
lowest level around 2017 and rise thereafter as a result of both economic and 
demographic forces.   
The PRC provides a compelling setting to study this issue for several reasons. Since 
the market-oriented reforms in the early 1980s, the PRC has experienced rapid 
economic growth, with double-digit annual growth rates, for about three decades. 
However, this process has also been associated with rapid population aging and 
soaring inequality. Now the second-largest economy in the world, the PRC’s Gini 
coefficient increased from 0.30 in 1980 to 0.53 in 2010 (Xie and Zhou 2014) and is 
currently among the highest in the world. Despite a recent moderate decline in 
inequality, the income distribution in the PRC remains a serious issue, especially in 
comparison with countries at a similar stage of economic development. High and 
persistent income inequality can significantly weaken demand, impede growth, induce 
crises, and erode social cohesion (Berg and Ostry 2011; IMF 2016). At the same time, 
the PRC is rapidly becoming older as a consequence of the family planning policy and 
increasing life expectancy. The number of people aged over 60 reached 185 million, or 
14% of the total population, at the end of 2011. 3 Moreover, its aging process will 
3  The figure is from the website of the National Bureau of Statistics, available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/ 
english/newsandcomingevents/t20120120_402780233.htm. 
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continue at a remarkable pace for the next few decades. The PRC’s Fiscal Policy 
Report projects that the PRC will become the world’s most aged society by 2030 and 
that by 2050 the number of elderly people in the PRC will have increased to 454 
million, 33% of the total population (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 2010).4  
Most of the discussion on inequality in the PRC is about inequality of income (Meng 
2004; Meng, Gregory, and Wang 2005; Wan, Lu, and Chen 2006) or different 
components of income. The enlarging income gap is explained from the perspectives 
of international trade, property value, and even sociology. For example, Han, Liu, and 
Zhang (2012) investigate the impact of globalization on wage inequality and find that 
the WTO accession is responsible for the increase in wage inequality. Li, Li, and 
Ouyang (2017) find that in the PRC, when inequality is measured by wealth that 
incorporates housing rather than by income, it becomes a much more severe concern. 
Additionally, from a sociological perspective, the work by Xie (2016) suggests that 
inequality in the PRC has been greatly influenced by certain collective mechanisms, 
such as regions and work units, and that most people in the PRC view inequality as an 
inevitable problem accompanying economic growth.  
Despite the strong links between demographic trends and inequality, as implied by the 
life cycle theory, there is still limited evidence of investigation of this topic within the 
PRC context. Zhang and Xiang (2014) analyze four rounds of data from the Urban 
Households’ Income and Expenditure Survey (UHIES) and claim that aging contributed 
around 10% of the rising consumption inequality in urban areas of the PRC between 
2003 and 2009. Employing three waves of rural household surveys in the China 
Household Income Project (CHIP) for the period 1988–2002, Qu and Zhao (2008) 
investigate the consumption inequality between urban and rural households in the PRC 
and find that a large consumption disparity exists in the low-income quantiles. Zou, Li, 
and Yu (2013) explore the impact of birth cohort on consumption inequality, with the 
use of electronic appliances as a proxy, and show that consumption inequality is higher 
than income inequality in the PRC. Using the China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) data, Zhong (2011) examines the relationship between income inequality and 
population aging in rural areas of the PRC and indicates that population aging has 
recently made a significant contribution to the sharp increase in income inequality in 
rural areas of the PRC. 
In this study we first build a two-period overlapping-generation (OLG) model with an 
uncertain lifetime to illustrate theoretically the overall effects of population aging on 
income and consumption inequality. In our model, young workers’ different levels of 
productivity lead to income equality within their own age cohort. A young worker also 
decides how to allocate his first-period income between consumption and saving to 
maximize his lifetime utility. For an unskilled old worker, the savings from his young 
age will be his only source of income (and consumption) in the second period, while a 
skilled old worker can still be employed and earn a wage, albeit at a discounted rate, to 
supplement his second-period income (and consumption). We find that population 
aging has an overall effect of increasing inequality within the society and that, within 
the young cohort, consumption inequality is higher than income inequality.  
For the empirical analysis, we employ Deaton and Paxson’s (1994a) approach to 
examine the age effect on income and consumption inequality in both urban and rural 
areas by using a data set constructed from the nine waves of the China Health and 
Nutrition Survey (CHNS), conducted between 1989 and 2011. We first investigate how 
4  The Government of the PRC defines the elderly in the PRC as the population aged 60 and over. The 
data are retrieved from the 2012 revision of the World Population Prospects. See http://esa.un.org/ 
unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/Interpolated.htm. 
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income and consumption inequality evolve with age in a period of dynamic economic 
growth accompanied by rapid population aging. Given the widely acknowledged 
regional disparity in the PRC, we compare the age effect on inequality in rural and 
urban areas. We assume that skilled labor concentrates in urban areas while the labor 
in rural areas is mainly unskilled. Regarding the importance of finance in smoothing 
consumption and income over the life cycle, we also examine the role of financial 
development in moderating the income inequality triggered by the age effect. To 
enhance the statistical efficiency, control for changes in household demographics, and 
examine the impact of finance on inequality, we extend Deaton and Paxson’s (1994a) 
cohort-level model by conducting a household regression analysis. All our empirical 
findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions. 
We expand the research frontier by studying the age effect on both income and 
consumption inequality. The joint analysis of consumption and income inequality is 
informative in several ways. First, individuals’ utility is related more closely to 
consumption and leisure than income. Several studies (Cutler and Katz 1992; Johnson 
and Shipp 1997; Blundell and Preston 1998; Pendakur 1998) show that, compared with 
income, consumption is a direct and more accurate measure of welfare and long-term 
earning capacity. Second, the difference between consumption and income reflects  
the efficiency of the consumption-smoothing mechanism under various credit or 
insurance arrangements (Blundell et al. 2008; Krueger et al. 2010; Attanasio and 
Pistaferri 2016). Third, underreporting of income is regarded as a serious challenge for 
household surveys in the PRC, because people are widely reluctant to report their 
income outside regular jobs, in particular job-related benefits and “gray” income. In 
contrast, consumption suffers less from such underreporting problems. By comparing 
the different dynamics of consumption and income inequality within the same cohort, 
we can gain insights into the factors governing the intertemporal choice of people in  
the PRC. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model; 
section 3 describes the data, the construction of the key variables, and the econometric 
methodology; section 4 provides the descriptive statistics and empirical results; and 
section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. THEORETICAL MODEL 
We use a simple two-period overlapping-generation (OLG) model with an uncertain 
lifetime. For simplicity we assume that each household has one individual person. The 
level of aptitude, hence productivity, is different among young workers and is assumed 
to be exogenously given when born. The number of “skilled” young workers is n, and 
so is the number of “unskilled” young workers in the economy. Hence, we have a total 
size of 2𝑛 young population.  
Each young adult born in Period t works during the first period and earns a wage, 𝑤𝑡𝑖, 
where 𝑖 = 𝑠,𝑢, which represents different types of worker in productivity. We have that: 
𝑤𝑡
𝑢 = 𝑤𝑡,  (1a) 
𝑤𝑡
𝑠 = 𝑒𝑤𝑡, (1b) 
where 𝑒 > 1 is exogenously given and reflects the productivity advantage for the wage. 
Since we normalize the length of time in each period, the wage is also each individual 
worker’s income during the first period. Naturally, if we wish to measure the degree of 
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income inequality within the young cohort in Period t, we can conveniently use e for 
that purpose. A larger e indicates a higher degree of income inequality among the 
young workers.  
While young, each adult gives birth to one child, who will eventually replace him in the 
society; hence, the size of the young population remains constant at 2n over time. In 
this model we assume that everyone lives a full young adulthood with certainty while 
facing a probability of 𝑥, where 0 < 𝑥 < 1, of surviving into old age; that is, there is a 
probability of 1 − 𝑥  of death at the beginning of the second period. This probability 
profile (𝑥, 1 − 𝑥) is exogenous and common knowledge. Hence, the size of the old 
population in the society is 2𝑥𝑛, and the total population is 2(1 + 𝑥)𝑛. The ratio of 
skilled labor to unskilled labor is 1:1, for simplicity, within both young and old 
populations, as we assume that aging and labor productivity are two factors that are 
independent of each other. It should be clear that an increase in 𝑥  represents an 
overall aging population in the society. 
An unskilled old worker will not work in the second period, because his weakened 
physical condition will no longer qualify him for a blue-collar job; as a result, his only 
income at this stage will come from his young-age savings. A skilled old worker, on the 
other hand, has the opportunity to take a light, white-collar job and supplement his 
income. Nonetheless, the loss of cognitive ability and physical strength associated with 
aging means that his productivity remains a fraction of that when he was young. Thus, 
we have: 
𝑣𝑡+1
𝑠 = 𝜆𝑤𝑡+1.  (1c) 
We use 𝑣𝑡+1𝑠  to denote the wage of an old skilled worker in Period 𝑡 + 1 (hence, he was 
a young skilled worker in Period t), where 0 < 𝜆 < 1 is exogenously given and indicates 
his disadvantage in competing with young workers on the competitive labor market. 
A young worker needs to decide how to allocate his first-period budget/income 
between consumption and savings to maximize his lifetime utility. Such an 
intertemporal decision-making process of a representative young worker in Period t 
and his preference are described by the following utility function: 
𝑢𝑡
𝑖 = ln 𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽𝑥 ln𝑑𝑡+1𝑖 . (2) 
For this young worker of type i in Period t, we use 𝑐𝑡𝑖 to denote his consumption in the 
first period and 𝑑𝑡+1𝑖  to indicate his anticipated second-period consumption. We factor 
in two additional considerations: 𝑥, the probability of surviving into the second period, 
and 𝛽 ∈ [0,1], the usual time discount. The budget constraint of this young worker of 
type i in Period t is as follows: 
𝑐𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝑤𝑡𝑖. (3) 
We further assume that all savings are invested in the financial market and that the 
gross rate of return for those surviving to old age is 𝑟𝑡+1 𝑥⁄ , where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the risk-free 
interest rate in the competitive capital market. The budget constraint for an old agent  
is therefore:  
𝑑𝑡+1
𝑢 = 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑡+1
𝑥
, (4a) 
𝑑𝑡+1
𝑠 = 𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑡+1
𝑥
+ 𝑣𝑡+1𝑠 .  (4b) 
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We now examine the optimization problem faced by a young worker in Period t. 
Combining (2), (3), and (4a), we first have the following objective function for an 
unskilled young worker: max𝑠𝑡𝑢 𝑢𝑡𝑢 = ln(𝑤𝑡𝑢 − 𝑠𝑡𝑢) + 𝛽𝑥 ln �𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑡+1𝑥 �.  (2.u) 
Deriving the first-order condition (FOC), we arrive at the following results: 
𝑠𝑡
𝑢 = 𝛽𝑥
𝛽𝑥+1
𝑤𝑡,  (5a) 
𝑐𝑡
𝑢 = 1
𝛽𝑥+1
𝑤𝑡. (5b) 
It is straightforward that, when 𝛽 or 𝑥 increases, 𝑐𝑡𝑢 decreases while 𝑠𝑡𝑢 increases, both 
of which make intuitive sense.  
Next, combining (2), (3), and (4b), we have the following objective function for a skilled 
young worker: max𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑢𝑡𝑠 = ln(𝑤𝑡𝑠 − 𝑠𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽𝑥 ln �𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑡+1𝑥 + 𝑣𝑡+1𝑠 �. (2.s) 
Deriving the first-order condition (FOC), we arrive at the following results: 
𝑠𝑡
𝑠 = 𝛽𝑥
𝛽𝑥+1
𝑒𝑤𝑡 −
𝜆𝑤𝑡+1(𝛽𝑥+1)𝑟𝑡+1
𝑥
,  (6a) 
𝑐𝑡
𝑠 = 1
𝛽𝑥+1
𝑒𝑤𝑡 + 𝜆𝑤𝑡+1(𝛽𝑥+1)𝑟𝑡+1
𝑥
,  (6b) 
If we compare (5b) and (6b), it is easy to see that 
𝑐𝑡
𝑠 𝑐𝑡
𝑢⁄ = 𝑒 + 𝜆𝑤𝑡+1
𝑤𝑡
𝑥
𝑟𝑡+1
.  (7) 
As long as the economy is growing, the consumption inequality has the following 
property: 
𝑐𝑡
𝑠 𝑐𝑡
𝑢⁄ > 𝑤𝑡𝑠 𝑤𝑡𝑢⁄ = 𝑒.  (8) 
This result reports that, within the young cohort, consumption inequality is higher than 
income inequality. There is an intuitive explanation behind it: the unskilled young 
worker needs to save more today for the future, since there will be no other source of 
income when he becomes old.  
As for the old cohort, it should be pointed out that, due to the nature of this OLG model 
with no bequest motive, consumption should always equal income in the second stage, 
and we have: 
𝑑𝑡+1
𝑢 = 𝑟𝑡+1
𝑥
𝛽𝑥
𝛽𝑥+1
𝑤𝑡,  
𝑑𝑡+1
𝑠 = 𝑟𝑡+1
𝑥
𝛽𝑥
𝛽𝑥+1
𝑒𝑤𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥𝛽𝑥+1 𝜆𝑤𝑡+1. 
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We can fairly easily derive that: 
𝑑𝑡+1
𝑠 𝑑𝑡+1
𝑢⁄ = 𝑒 + 𝜆𝑤𝑡+1
𝑤𝑡
𝑥
𝑟𝑡+1
. (9) 
This is not a surprising result in the context of the intertemporal framework of making  
a decision. 
The total population of young unskilled workers is n in the economy. The total size of 
young skilled workers is n as well, which provides a total of 𝑒𝑛, where 𝑒 > 1, units of 
unskilled labor equivalent. We also know that skilled old workers in the economy 
provide a total of 𝜆𝑥𝑛, where 0 < 𝜆, 𝑥 < 1, units of unskilled labor equivalent; hence, the 
total stock of labor available in this economy in Period t, for aggregation production, 
measured in unskilled labor equivalent, is as follows: 
𝐿𝑡 = (1 + 𝑒 + 𝜆𝑥)𝑛. (10) 
As for the physical capital market, the total capital stock is funded through savings by 
young workers, both skilled and unskilled, in the previous stage, as follows: 
𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑢. (11) 
Conditions (10) and (11) also serve as the factor market clearing conditions when we 
later solve for the equilibrium in the economy. 
The aggregate production is represented by the following Cobb–Douglas production 
function on a perfectly competitive output market: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐿𝑡1−𝛼, where 0 < 𝛼 < 1.  (12) 
In this production function, 𝐴 > 0 is the conventional technology level. As the firm rents 
inputs on perfectly competitive factor markets, where 𝑤𝑡  and 𝑟𝑡  are the respective 
factor prices in Period t, the optimization problem for a profit-maximizing firm is  
as follows: max𝐾𝑡,𝐿𝑡 Π𝑡 = 𝐴𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐿𝑡1−𝛼 − 𝑟𝑡𝐾𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡.  (13) 
We let 𝑘𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡/𝐿𝑡 be the capital per worker (measured in unskilled labor equivalent), 
and we have the following two FOCs: 
𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑘𝑡𝛼,  (14) 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼𝐴𝑘𝑡𝛼−1.  (15) 
We now proceed to derive the equilibrium in this economy. Combining (5a), (6a), (10), 
and (11), we have the following dynamic equation for capital:  
𝑘𝑡+1 = 𝐾𝑡+1𝐿𝑡+1 = 11+𝑒+𝜆𝑥 �𝛽𝑥(𝑒+1)𝑤𝑡1+𝛽𝑥 − 𝜆𝑥𝑤𝑡+1(1+𝛽𝑥)𝑟𝑡+1�.  
Next, we replace 𝑤𝑡 , 𝑤𝑡+1 , and 𝑟𝑡+1  with (14) and (15) and obtain the following 
equation, which represents the law of motion of capital per worker within the economy:  
𝑘𝑡+1 = 11+𝑒+𝜆𝑥 �𝛽𝑥(𝑒+1)(1−𝛼)𝐴𝑘𝑡𝛼 1+𝛽𝑥  − 𝜆𝑥(1−𝛼)𝑘𝑡+1𝛼  (1+𝛽𝑥)𝛼𝑘𝑡𝛼−1�.  (16) 
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Assuming perfect foresight, the steady state is defined as follows: 
𝑘∗ = � 𝐴(1−𝛼)𝛼(1+𝑒)𝛽𝑥
𝛼+𝛼𝑒+𝜆𝑥+𝛼𝛽𝑥(1+𝑒+𝜆𝑥)� 11−𝛼.  (17) 
We also have: 
𝜕𝑘∗
𝜕𝑥
> 0, 𝜕𝑘∗
𝜕𝛽
> 0, 𝜕𝑘∗
𝜕𝑒
> 0, 𝜕𝑘∗
𝜕𝜆
< 0.  (18) 
Simple proof can be seen in the Appendix. These results make intuitive sense. A 
longer life expectancy induces a higher saving rate and hence higher capital per worker 
in the economy; similarly, a lower discount rate (i.e. a future value is worth more in the 
present term) provides an incentive for higher savings, and a higher wage, albeit only 
for skilled workers, allows higher savings on average. Of course, if an old skilled worker 
expects to be paid more, his incentive to save while young will naturally decline.  
Our main interest remains with the income/consumption inequality as well as how the 
aging population in the society affects it. For reporting convenience we create an 
inequality index, denoted as Ψ , to measure the degree of income or consumption 
inequality at different ages (young and old) within each cohort, defined as follows: 
Ψ𝑦,𝑖𝑛𝑐 = 𝑤𝑡𝑠 𝑤𝑡𝑢⁄ , Ψ𝑦,𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑐𝑡𝑢⁄ , Ψ𝑜 = 𝑑𝑡+1𝑠 𝑑𝑡+1𝑢⁄ .  (19) 
Combining (7), (9), (14), and (15), we have that 𝜕Ψ𝑦,𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝜕𝑥
= 𝜕Ψ𝑜
𝜕𝑥
= 𝜕
𝜕𝑥
�𝑒 + 𝜆𝑤𝑡+1
𝑤𝑡
𝑥
𝑟𝑡+1
�, so 
𝜕Ψ𝑦,𝑐𝑜𝑛∗
𝜕𝑥
= 𝜕Ψ𝑜∗
𝜕𝑥
= 𝜕
𝜕𝑥
�
𝜆
𝛼𝐴
(𝑘∗)1−𝛼𝑥� = 𝜆
𝛼𝐴
�
𝑥(1−𝛼)(𝑘∗)𝛼 𝜕𝑘∗𝜕𝑥 + (𝑘∗)1−𝛼� . Given (17) and (18), we 
have that:  
𝜕Ψ𝑦,𝑐𝑜𝑛∗
𝜕𝑥
> 0 , 𝜕Ψ𝑜∗
𝜕𝑥
> 0. (20) 
This result suggests that the consumption inequality within the young population 
increases when an aging population is anticipated; the overall impact is similar within 
the old population for both income and consumption inequality. 
To summarize the results of our theoretical study, we obtain the following two key 
findings: (a) consumption inequality is higher than income inequality within the cohort of 
young workers; and (b) an aging population has an overall impact of increasing 
inequality within the society. These theoretical results are largely in alignment with our 
empirical findings, presented in the next sections.  
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data Source and Key Variables 
To investigate the intertemporal choice of consumers and its impact on inequality,  
an ideal data set should contain panel data on income and consumption covering a 
large number of households for a long period of time (Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston 
2008; Kurosaki, Kurita, and Ligon 2009). If no such ideal data sets are available, it  
is imperative to use a repeated cross-section data set of household income and 
consumption expenditure covering as many years as possible (Deaton and Paxson 
1994a). In the PRC, several household survey data sets are used to study inequality, 
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including the China Family Panel Study (CFPS), Chinese General Social Survey 
(CGSS), China Household Income Project (CHIP), Chinese Household Finance Survey 
(CHFS), and China Labor Force Dynamic Survey (CLDS). However, most of them 
cover very short periods of time. For example, the launching years of the CGSS, 
CFPS, CHFS, and CLDS are 2003, 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively. The CHIP was 
launched in 1988 but does not contain longitudinal data, and the respondents are 
different for each round of the survey. Moreover, only five rounds of the survey have 
been conducted so far. 
The data used in this paper come from an ongoing, open-cohort, longitudinal study—
the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). This is a collaborative project by the 
Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the 
National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention. Nine waves of the survey5 have been conducted since 1989 
on 4,400 households with a total of 26,000 individuals in 15 PRC provincial units6 that 
vary substantially in geography, economic development, public resources, and health 
indicators. Employing such data, which represent a third of the country’s population, we 
are released from the limitation of using data from an otherwise small, geographically 
restricted region that may be unrepresentative of the larger setting. Moreover, our data 
cover a long period of 22 years, allowing us to track the development process of 
inequality and the aging population during a period of rapid economic growth in the 
PRC. We stratify the counties in all the provinces by income, and then we adopt a 
multistage, random-cluster process to select four counties from each province. The 
sample is made up of 36 suburban neighborhoods and 108 towns. The CHNS asks 
respondents questions regarding individual and household demographics, education, 
health and nutrition, occupations and labor force participation, income, use of health 
services, housing and asset ownership, time use, and so on. The characteristics of  
the households in the sample are comparable to the national averages. One main 
advantage of the CHNS data is that they provide detailed information about almost all 
potential sources of household income, including wage income, retirement income, 
subsidies, earnings from sources of business, farming, fishing, gardening, livestock, 
and others. It has better coverage of urban subsidies, an important source of income 
for non-farm self-employment. Moreover, the longitudinal master files created by the 
CHNS enable us to trace the evolution of respondents’ income and consumption over 
time. In addition, the CHNS data have a good number of overlapping cohorts across 
rounds, which are a great advantage in estimating the age effects on inequality. Figure 
1 plots the population pyramid of the CHNS sample by age for the four years 1989, 
1997, 2006, and 2011, and it clearly indicates the rapid process of population aging in 
the PRC in the last three decades.7 
  
5  Those surveys were completed in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011, 
respectively. 
6  The survey started with the nine provincial units of Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou in 1989. Three mega-cities, Beijing, Chongqing, and 
Shanghai, have joined this cohort since 2011. Three more provinces, Shaanxi, Yunnan, and 
Zhejiang, have joined since 2015. 
7  To understand the representativeness of the CHNS data, we compare the age distribution figures of the 
CHNS in the years 1989, 1997, 2006, and 2011 with those of the PRC Census data in the years 1989, 
1990, 2000, and 2010 and find that the population pyramid of the CHNS data is close to that of the 
Census data and that our analysis will be able to reflect the real situation in the PRC. The population 
pyramid of the PRC Census data is available on request.  
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Figure 1: Population Distribution by Age in the PRC, 1989–2011 
 
However, the CHNS does not contain data on nondurables’ consumption, like 
expenditure on food (Benjamin et al. 2007). Hence, we pay special attention to the 
inequality of the consumption of durable goods, including electronic appliances and 
means of transportation. The consumption of durable goods is important in assessing 
consumption inequality thoroughly, since it accounts for a large share of household 
expenses. While consumption categories involving small and infrequent purchases are 
more vulnerable to poor reporting, large expenses on durable goods are often reported 
sufficiently well. In addition, durables’ consumption relies heavily on the liquidity 
facilitated through financial institutions. McKenzie (2005) shows that, in the absence of 
household consumption data, household ownership of certain durable assets can be a 
reasonable proxy for inequality in living standards. Using Mexican data, he proves that 
inequality measured with asset indicators can predict the nondurables’ consumption 
inequality very well. Employing two alternative sources of data, Hassett and Mathur 
(2012) find that the trend of inequality measured using nondurables’ consumption is 
comparable to inequality measured using durables’ consumption in the US.8  
To construct the variables to use in this study, we first select households that have 
valid and complete information on income and durables’ consumption and are aged 
between 20 and 75. We then collect information on the household heads’ age, gender, 
educational attainment, and employment status in addition to the household total 
disposable income, value of durable goods, household registration (hukou) status, 
province of residence, and so on. The real income per capita for each household is 
calculated as the ratio of the total net household income to the number of household 
members, adjusted by the consumer price index of 2011.9 The CHNS survey includes 
detailed information on the stock and current value of the electronic appliances and 
8  Hassett and Mathur (2012) compute inequality in nondurables’ consumption with data from the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), which provides a continuous and comprehensive flow of data on 
the buying habits of American consumers and contains detailed expenditure data on small and 
frequently purchased items, such as food. They calculate inequality in durables’ consumption with data 
from the Residential Energy Consumption Survey, which includes questions on households’ use of 
appliances such as microwaves, dishwashers, computers, and printers. 
9  The total net household income is the summation of the net income from household business, farming, 
fishing, gardening, livestock, subsidies, pensions, wages, and other sources. 
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means of transportation owned by each household.10  Similarly, we compute the per 
capita real consumption of durables as the ratio of the total value of durable goods to 
the number of households, adjusted with the consumer price index of 2011. 
Figure 2: Income vs. Durables’ Consumption in the PRC 
 
Data source: China Health and Nutrition Survey, 1989–2011. 
Figure 2 plots the growth paths of household income and durables’ consumption in the 
PRC during the years from 1989 to 2011. The real income increased from 3,528 yuan 
to 15,933 yuan, while the durables’ consumption grew considerably from 741 yuan to 
8,270 yuan. In terms of trends, the household income and durables’ consumption 
moved in tandem until around 2004, but the gap seems to have widened thereafter. 
3.2 Methodology 
To assess the age and cohort effects on inequality, we construct age dummies for 
those household heads aged between 20 and 75. We drop the dummy variable for  
the youngest group to avoid multicollinearity among the age dummies. Based on the 
birth year or age of the respondents in 1989, we define cohort dummies based  
on five-year age bands, specifically 1920–1924, 1925–1929, 1930–1934, 1935–1939, 
1940–1945, 1946–1949, 1950–1954, 1955–1959, 1960–1964, 1965–1969, and  
1970–1974, respectively. Given the age and the time of the survey, we determine a 
cohort as b=a–t+1989, where a represents age and t represents the year of the survey. 
Similarly, we drop the dummy variable for the youngest cohort to avoid multicollinearity 
among cohort dummies. 
 
10  The electronic appliances listed in the CHNS survey questionnaire include VCR, TV set, washing 
machine, refrigerator, air conditioner, sewing machine, electric fan, computer, camera, microwave oven, 
electric rice cooker, pressure cooker, telephone, cell phone, VCD or DVD, and satellite dish, while  
the means of transportation include tricycle, bicycle, motorcycle, and automobile. The survey asks the 
respondents questions such as “Does your household own this type of appliance/transportation?”; “How 
many are owned?”; and “What is the total value of the appliance/transportation?”  
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We employ the variances of log consumption and log income as the main measures of 
inequality, a widely adopted method (Deaton and Paxson 1994a; Ohtake and Saito 
1998). With a data set running for 22 years, we are able to observe earnings and 
consumption for a range of different cohorts and separate the cohort effect from the 
age effect. Following Deaton and Paxson (1994a), we estimate the household model 
as follows: (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼?̅?𝑡)2=∑ 𝛼𝑐𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑐 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑛 , (21) 
where 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼?̅?𝑡 is the logarithm value of the average per capita real income or durables’ 
consumption for cohort c in year t and 𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑐  and 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛  are the cohort and age 
dummies, respectively. In this regression the coefficients 𝛼𝑐  reflect the cohort effect 
while the coefficients 𝛽𝑛  represent the age effect and trace the evolution of  
within-cohort inequality over the lifetime. 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡  is a vector of control variables that 
describe household i’s characteristics in year t, such as the gender of the household 
head or the size of the household. By including 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡  we can directly control for the 
changes in household demographic features and the sampling design of each survey 
to achieve gains in statistical efficiency. Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the 
key variables. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Key Variables 
Variables Definition Obs. Mean Std Dev. RSD Min. Max. 
Income Household net income 
per capita 
27,812 7,892.82 9,210.35 1.17 174.85 79,066.27 
Durables Household durables per 
capita  
27,812 3,633.51 8,162.48 2.25 25.77 101,683.30 
Hhsize Household size 27,812 3.67 1.44 0.39 1.00 13.00 
Gender Dummy variable set to  
1 if the gender of the 
household head is male 
27,812 0.85 0.35 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Age Age of the household 
head 
27,812 49.97 12.07 0.24 20.00 75.00 
DtoGDP Deposit to GDP 27,812 1.06 0.53 0.50 0.39 4.30 
LtoGDP Loan to GDP 27,812 0.90 0.25 0.28 0.59 1.96 
DLtoGDP Summation of deposit and 
loan to GDP 
27,812 1.96 0.76 0.39 0.99 6.26 
FI_Per_Thousand Number of financial 
institutions per  
1,000 people 
27,812 0.05 0.04 0.74 0.00 0.17 
One factor that equation (21) defines but neither the age nor the cohort effect accounts 
for is the presence of time effects (e.g., common macroeconomic shocks), which 
impinge on all cohorts to a greater or lesser degree, but they are located in real time 
and the cohort or age effect cannot account for them. The solution is to include fixed-
year effects (𝜃𝑡); hence, the equation becomes: (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼?̅?𝑡)2 = ∑ 𝛼𝑐𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑐 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑛 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡. (22) 
However, an unrestricted estimation is not possible due to the dependency between 
age, cohort, and year. In particular, given that the cohort is the age minus the year  
plus a constant, the parameters of equation (22) are not identified. To overcome this 
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difficulty, we apply the normalization method developed by Deaton and Paxson (1994b) 
for estimation.11  
Considering that the age effect that equations (21) and (22) estimate might be linear,12 
and to assess the overall effect of population aging on inequality, we also estimate the 
restricted versions of (21) and (22) as follows: (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔�����𝐼𝑐𝑡)2=𝛽𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑐𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡, (23) 
where parameter 𝛽 represents the relationship between age and inequality. Regarding 
the importance of finance in smoothing consumption over the life cycle, we also include 
an interaction term between the age effect and the financial development to examine 
its role in moderating inequality triggered by the age effect in further analysis. Its sign 
and statistical significance will help us to identify the role of financial inclusion in 
attenuating the age effect on inequality. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Evolution of Income and Consumption Inequality 
Using CHNS data, the figures below demonstrate how income and consumption 
inequality have evolved in the PRC from 1989 to 2011. We computed the level  
of inequality as the variance of the logarithm values. Figure 3(a) suggests that 
consumption inequality is higher than income inequality in all the years, although they 
seem to converge over time. Figure 3(b) shows that consumption inequality in rural 
areas is higher than that in urban areas, while income inequality is largely the same in 
rural and urban areas. Figure 3(c) shows that cohorts with low educational attainment 
tend to experience greater consumption and income inequality than cohorts with high 
educational attainment. These facts are different from those observed in advanced 
economies, such as the US and the UK, where income inequality is higher than 
consumption inequality (Krueger and Perri 2006). According to the PIH, consumption 
inequality reflects idiosyncratic shocks that are insurable on the financial market  
while income inequality captures both insurable idiosyncratic shocks and uninsurable 
risks. Higher consumption inequality, especially for less-educated rural farmers in  
the PRC, indicates the limited access to financial and insurance services to hedge 
against adverse shocks that may put their livelihood at risk. This is not uncommon in 
developing countries (Fafchamps 2003; Dercon 2005), where it is difficult for poor 
households to smooth their consumption inter-temporally, and the credit markets in 
those countries often lag behind the economic development.  
  
11  In practice all the year dummies are constrained to be orthogonal to a time trend and add up to zero. 
The base year is set to be a timeless average of all years so that any time trend is attributed to the 
cohort and age and not to the time. 
12  Deaton and Paxson (1994a) find that the age effects in Taipei,China, Great Britain, and the United 
States are approximately linear.  
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Figure 3: Income and Durables’ Consumption Inequality in the PRC, 1989–2011 
 
4.2 Inequality and the Age Effect 
We then test the lifetime profile of income and consumption inequality. Figures 4 and 5 
plot the log variance of income and durables’ consumption for the same cohort in 
different survey years. With the year of observation on the horizontal axis and the 
variances on the vertical axis, each panel shows the evolution of inequality of a single 
cohort specified by the age of the household head. The last panel of each figure shows 
the aggregate inequality for all households in each survey year as the sum of the 
weighted average of within-cohort inequality and inequality across cohorts. An 
increasing age effect on income inequality is observed for most cohorts, although it is 
not linear. The overall income inequality also displays an upward trend, particularly 
between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, when a strong increase is apparent. 
However, the age effect on durables’ consumption inequality for most cohorts, except 
the youngest cohort, assumes an inverse U-shaped pattern. The panel of the full 
sample suggests that the inequality in durables’ consumption increases until 2000 and 
declines thereafter. Comparing these two types of inequality, we find that consumption 
inequality is higher than income inequality, especially in young ages. 
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Figure 4: Variance of Log Income by Age Group 
 
Figure 5: Variance of Log Durables’ Consumption by Age Group 
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The estimation results of equation (21) are not presented in numerical form, since there 
are multiple cohort and age effects. Following the method by Deaton and Paxson 
(1994a), we plot the age effect after controlling the cohort and year effect in Figure 6. 
Inequality in income increases with age throughout the whole life cycle, while inequality 
in durables’ consumption increases with age only during young periods and then 
remains stable. 
Figure 6: Age Effects and Inequality 
 
Panel A: Income Inequality Panel B: Consumption Inequality 
Tables 2 and 3 present the estimation results of equation (23) regarding the overall 
effect of an aging population on inequality. The coefficients for age, our main variable 
of interest, are significantly positive, indicating that an aging population enlarges 
inequality in both income and durables’ consumption. The comparison of the 
magnitude of coefficients indicates that the age effect is larger for consumption than for 
income. This finding is consistent with our theoretical prediction. To test the impact of 
financial development on the age effect, we expand our estimation by including an 
interaction term of age effect × financial development. The idea is that, as the financial 
development advances, it is more likely for households to leverage financial tools to 
smooth their consumption over their life cycle and hence to attenuate the age effect on 
inequality. A statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term with a sign 
opposite to that of the coefficient for the age effect would suggest that financial 
development helps to moderate the size of the age effect on inequality. We measure 
financial development with four indicators: loan to GDP, deposit to GDP, sum of loan 
and deposit to GDP, and number of financial institutions per 1000 residents. Tables 2 
and 3 show that the coefficients for the interaction terms are negative and statistically 
significant for consumption inequality but insignificant for income inequality in most 
cases. These findings confirm the positive role of the financial sector in moderating the 
age effect on consumption inequality. 
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Considering the widely acknowledged urban–rural disparity in the PRC, we divide 
households into urban and rural groups by their hukou status and compare the age 
effects on income and consumption inequality across the two groups. The results 
shown in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the age effects on both income and consumption 
inequality are stronger in urban areas than in rural areas. The statistically insignificant 
coefficient for the interaction term between age and financial indicators shown in 
Table 4 implies that financial development hardly moderates the age effect on income 
inequality in either rural or urban areas. However, the coefficients for all the interaction 
terms are significantly negative in Table 5, suggesting the important role of financial 
development in attenuating the age effect on consumption inequality. Moreover, the 
impact of financial development is larger in rural areas than in urban areas. 
Table 2: Aging and Income Inequality 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Age 0.0285*** 0.00356 0.0240*** 0.0284*** 0.0267*** 0.0251*** 0.0179*** 
 (18.05) (0.505) (5.305) (4.678) (5.664) (4.573) (2.971) 
AgeSquare  5.86e-05      
  (0.841)      
Gender   0.0358 0.0372 0.0370 0.0366 0.0334 
   (1.124) (1.168) (1.160) (1.147) (1.048) 
Hhsize   0.101*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.104*** 
   (12.35) (12.32) (12.35) (12.34) (12.67) 
LtoGDP    0.114    
    (0.495)    
Age*LtoGDP    –0.00558    
    (–1.340)    
DtoGDP     –0.0386   
     (–0.378)   
Age*DtoGDP     –0.00318   
     (–1.411)   
DLtoGDP      –0.0789  
      (–0.900)  
Age*DLtoGDP      –0.000145  
      (–0.0990)  
FI_Per_Thousand       –5.834*** 
       (–3.031) 
Age*FI_Per_Thousand       0.110*** 
       (3.671) 
Constant –1.233*** 0.614*** –1.570*** –1.443*** –1.222*** –1.116** –1.116** 
 (–8.118) (3.569) (–3.864) (–2.800) (–2.586) (–2.189) (–2.475) 
Observations 27,812 27,812 27,812 27,812 27,812 27,812 27,812 
R–squared 0.013 0.004 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.037 
Wave Effect No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: 1) Authors’ estimation based on the data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey, 1989–2011. t-statistics in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
2) LtoGDP – loan to GDP; DtoGDP – deposit to GDP; DLtoGDP – (deposit + loan)/GDP; FI_Per_Thousand: number of 
financial institutions per 1000 people. 
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Table 3: Aging and Durables’ Inequality 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Age 0.108*** 0.174*** 0.0281** 0.0499*** 0.0389*** 0.0652*** 0.0827*** 
 
(22.27) (6.099) (2.083) (2.756) (2.772) (3.986) (4.616) 
AgeSquare 
 
–0.00183*** 
     
  
(–7.383) 
     Gender 
  
1.413*** 1.422*** 1.420*** 1.423*** 1.427*** 
   
(14.88) (14.98) (14.97) (14.99) (15.04) 
Hhsize 
  
0.453*** 0.453*** 0.453*** 0.448*** 0.437*** 
   
(18.53) (18.53) (18.56) (18.30) (17.80) 
LtoGDP 
   
0.170 
   
    
(0.248) 
   AgeLtoGDP 
   
–0.0314** 
   
    
(–2.529) 
   DtoGDP 
    
1.391*** 
  
     
(4.583) 
  AgeDtoGDP 
    
–0.0477*** 
  
     
(–7.102) 
  DLtoGDP 
     
0.497* 
 
      
(1.905) 
 AgeDLtoGDP 
     
–0.0163*** 
 
      
(–3.741) 
 FI_Per_Thousand 
      
19.90*** 
       
(3.473) 
AgeFI_Per_Thousand 
      
–0.514*** 
       
(–5.758) 
Constant –4.173*** 1.978 –2.638** –0.765 –3.334** –2.704* –5.858*** 
 
(–8.903) (1.528) (–2.178) (–0.499) (–2.369) (–1.780) (–4.362) 
Observations 27,812 27,812 27,812 27,812 27,812 27,812 27,812 
R-squared 0.021 0.046 0.109 0.110 0.111 0.110 0.110 
Wave Effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: 1) Authors’ estimation based on the data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey, 1989–2011. t-statistics in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
2) LtoGDP – loan to GDP; DtoGDP – deposit to GDP; DLtoGDP – (deposit + loan)/GDP; FI_Per_Thousand: number of 
financial institutions per 1000 people. 
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Table 4: Aging and Income Inequality, Urban vs Rural 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Urban Rural 
Age 0.0364*** 0.0299*** 0.0301*** 0.0226*** 0.0207*** 0.0243*** 
 
(11.30) (3.302) (3.187) (12.74) (4.021) (4.533) 
Gender 
 
–0.132** –0.131** 
 
0.0447 0.0458 
  
(–2.487) (–2.467) 
 
(1.052) (1.078) 
Hhsize 
 
0.0731*** 0.0731*** 
 
0.0871*** 0.0872*** 
  
(3.968) (3.965) 
 
(9.611) (9.618) 
DtoGDP 
  
0.122 
  
–0.150 
   
(0.588) 
  
(–1.300) 
Age*DtoGDP 
  
–0.00315 
  
–0.00206 
   
(–0.760) 
  
(–0.760) 
Constant –1.999*** –2.165*** –2.295** –0.546*** –0.530 0.0783 
 
(–7.254) (–2.759) (–2.469) (–2.789) (–1.054) (0.137) 
Observations 9,480 9,480 9,480 18,332 18,332 18,332 
R-squared 0.016 0.043 0.043 0.010 0.033 0.033 
Wave Effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Table 5: Aging and Durables’ Inequality, Urban vs Rural 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Urban Rural 
Age 0.156*** 0.161*** 0.158*** 0.0247 0.0263 0.0993*** 
 
(7.121) (8.838) (6.764) (1.030) (1.532) (4.541) 
Gender –0.123 –0.114 –0.117 1.603*** 1.599*** 1.601*** 
 
(–1.194) (–1.115) (–1.138) (11.77) (11.75) (11.77) 
Hhsize 0.365*** 0.362*** 0.341*** 0.213*** 0.214*** 0.192*** 
 
(10.25) (10.20) (9.529) (7.344) (7.357) (6.583) 
LtoGDP –1.017 
  
–0.391 
  
 
(–1.271) 
  
(–0.411) 
  Age*LtoGDP –0.00536 
  
–0.0212 
  
 
(–0.404) 
  
(–1.172) 
  DtoGDP 
 
1.437*** 
  
1.144*** 
 
  
(3.582) 
  
(3.088) 
 Age*DtoGDP 
 
–0.0369*** 
  
–0.0455*** 
 
  
(–4.617) 
  
(–5.236) 
 FI_Per_Thousand 
  
41.72*** 
  
19.67*** 
   
(5.677) 
  
(2.736) 
Age*FI_Per_Thousand 
  
–0.582*** 
  
–0.647*** 
   
(–5.308) 
  
(–5.628) 
Constant –9.912*** –14.31*** –13.76*** 2.540 –0.204 –4.867*** 
 
(–5.134) (–7.979) (–8.118) (1.244) (–0.111) (–2.754) 
Observations 9,480 9,480 9,480 18,332 18,332 18,332 
R-squared 0.095 0.097 0.098 0.138 0.138 0.139 
Wave Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: 1) Authors’ estimation based on the data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey, 1989–2011. t-statistics in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
2) LtoGDP – loan to GDP; DtoGDP – Deposit to GDP; DLtoGDP – (deposit + loan)/GDP; FI_Per_Thousand: number of 
financial institutions per 1000 people. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This paper studies the distributional effects of population aging. For the theoretical 
analysis, we build a two-period overlapping-generation (OLG) model with an uncertain 
lifetime to assess the impacts of population aging on income and consumption 
inequality. We find that population aging has the overall effect of aggravating inequality. 
We also identify a pattern whereby consumption inequality is higher than income 
inequality within the young cohort. For the empirical analysis, we use the household 
data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) to evaluate the age effect on 
income and consumption inequality, and our findings are largely in alignment with the 
results predicted in the theoretical model. In addition, we find that the age effect is 
larger for consumption inequality than for income inequality and that the age effect on 
inequality is larger in urban areas than in rural areas. We also empirically investigate 
the role of the financial sector in smoothing consumption over the lifetime. Our 
conclusion is that financial inclusion helps to attenuate the age effect on inequality, 
implying the importance of promoting financial access among citizens in a rapidly  
aging society.  
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APPENDIX 
𝜕𝑘∗
𝜕𝑥
= 𝐴(1+𝑒)𝛼2𝛽(1+𝑒−𝑥2𝛽𝜆)� 𝐴(1+𝑒)𝑥(1−𝛼)𝛼𝛽(1+𝑒)𝛼(1+𝑥𝛽)+𝑥(1+𝑥𝛼𝛽)𝜆� 𝛼1−𝛼((1+𝑒)𝛼(1+𝑥𝛽)+𝜆𝑥(1+𝑥𝛼𝛽))2 ; 
𝜕𝑘∗
𝜕𝑒
= 𝐴𝑥2𝛼𝛽(1+𝑥𝛼𝛽)𝜆� 𝐴(1+𝑒)𝑥(1−𝛼)𝛼𝛽(1+𝑒)𝛼(1+𝑥𝛽)+𝑥(1+𝑥𝛼𝛽)𝜆� 𝛼1−𝛼((1+𝑒)𝛼(1+𝑥𝛽)+𝑥(1+𝑥𝛼𝛽)𝜆)2 ; 
𝜕𝑘∗
𝜕𝛽
= 𝐴(1+𝑒)𝑥𝛼(𝛼+𝑒𝛼+𝑥𝜆)� 𝐴(1+𝑒)𝑥(1−𝛼)𝛼𝛽(1+𝑒)𝛼(1+𝑥𝛽)+𝑥(1+𝑥𝛼𝛽)𝜆� 𝛼1−𝛼((1+𝑒)𝛼(1+𝑥𝛽)+𝑥(1+𝑥𝛼𝛽)𝜆)2 ; 
𝜕𝑘∗
𝜕𝜆
= − (1+𝑥𝛼𝛽)� 𝐴(1+𝑒)𝑥(1−𝛼)𝛼𝛽(1+𝑒)𝛼(1+𝑥𝛽)+𝑥(1+𝑥𝛼𝛽)𝜆�2−𝛼1−𝛼
𝐴(1+𝑒)(1−𝛼)2𝛼𝛽 . 
Because that > 1, 0 < 𝑥,𝛽, 𝜆 < 1, it is easy to see that 1 + 𝑒 − 𝑥2𝛽𝜆 > 0; hence, we 
have 𝜕𝑘
∗
𝜕𝑥
> 0. The other three results are straightforward. 
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